Bottom line
When an earlier action was timely commenced and later failed other than on the merits, R.C. 2305.19(A) lets the plaintiff commence a new action within one year of that failure (or within the original limitations period, if later), and every claim in it is saved, even claims whose limitations period ran before a previous use of the statute. Because the case came up as a certified conflict, the court also revived claims the plaintiff never cross-appealed.
The question: can a refiled action be saved again for claims that already needed saving?
Adam Kohn sued Glenmede Trust Company, N.A. and Robert Siewert in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas in November 2016. He voluntarily dismissed under Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) in September 2017 and refiled within a year. That second action was dismissed without prejudice under Civ.R. 41(A)(2) on August 2, 2022, and Kohn filed a third action on January 3, 2023 (¶ 2, 19).
The trial court held that Kohn could not use R.C. 2305.19(A) a second time. The Eighth District went claim by claim. The limitations period on the negligence claims had run before the second action was filed, so those claims had already been saved once and were barred; the fraud, breach-of-contract, and promissory-estoppel claims had never needed saving and could proceed (¶ 4). Recognizing a conflict with McGowan v. Family Medicine, Inc., 2002-Ohio-4071 (5th Dist.), the Eighth District certified whether the statute saves a refiled action as a whole or saves claims independently (¶ 5). The Supreme Court accepted both the certified conflict and Glenmede's discretionary appeal (¶ 7).
The holding: the statute saves the action, and it can be used again
Justice Shanahan wrote for the court, joined by Chief Justice Kennedy and Justices DeWine, Brunner, Deters, and Hawkins. Justice Fischer concurred in judgment only. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court (¶ 22).
When the saving statute permits a new action, a claim asserted in the earlier action is not barred merely because its limitations period also expired before a previous use of the statute (¶ 18). As relevant there, the statute requires that (1) the preceding action was commenced or attempted to be commenced, (2) it failed other than on the merits, and (3) the new action was commenced within one year of that failure or within the original applicable limitations period, whichever is later (¶ 18). Once an action has been timely commenced, the statute does not cap how many times a new action may be commenced on those terms (¶ 15). Because the second action was timely commenced under the statute, failed other than on the merits, and was followed by the third action within a year, the whole third action was saved, negligence claims included (¶ 19, 20, 22).
The reasoning: text, McCullough, and the reach of a certified conflict
The court reviewed the statutory question de novo (¶ 9) and began by rejecting the framing both sides had litigated:
“But, as we shall explain, this focus rests on a false premise.” (¶ 8)
The Eighth District had read the court's earlier decision in McCullough v. Bennett, 2024-Ohio-2783, which held that R.C. 2305.19(A) has no one-use restriction, as protecting only claims whose limitations period had not yet run at the second filing (¶ 12, 13). The court disagreed:
“But that is not what we held in McCullough.” (¶ 14)
The court then turned to the word action, relying on the definition in R.C. 2307.01 to conclude that an action is the judicial proceeding rather than each claim within it (¶ 15). On the policy worry about serial dismissals and refilings, the court declined to write in a limit: “The General Assembly could have included such a restriction.” (¶ 17). It pointed instead to the safeguards in Civ.R. 41, as it had in McCullough (¶ 17).
The most consequential paragraph for appellate lawyers is the last one. Kohn never cross-appealed the affirmance of the dismissal of his negligence claims, and the court quoted Kaplysh v. Takieddine, 35 Ohio St.3d 170, 175 (1988), and cited App.R. 3(C)(1) for the general rule that an appellee who does not cross-appeal cannot attack the judgment to enlarge his own rights (¶ 21). But the court had also accepted the certified conflict. Relying on Article IV of the Ohio Constitution and on Brown v. Borchers Ford, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 38, 39 (1977), it treated certification as bringing the entire case before it (¶ 21), and it acted on that authority:
“Because this is a certified-conflict case, we exercise our authority to reverse the portion of the court of appeals’ judgment that affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Kohn’s negligence claims” (¶ 21)
Why it matters for Ohio appeals
The saving statute is a recurring appellate issue. In a full-text search of a database of Ohio appellate decisions (pulled October 22, 2026), R.C. 2305.19 appears in 53 court of appeals decisions decided from July 11, 2024 through October 21, 2026, spread across 11 of the 12 districts, with the Eighth District (14) and the Tenth District (10) accounting for the most.
For pretrial rulings on appeal, the question becomes whether each link in the chain of filings meets the statute's three conditions, which is a record question.
The cross-appeal point reaches well beyond saving statutes. Glenmede appealed to the Supreme Court and came away with a judgment less favorable than the one it brought up, because the certified conflict put the whole case in play. Kohn obtained relief he never sought by cross-appeal. The court tied that result to the certified conflict and restated the general cross-appeal rule for other cases (¶ 21).
Practice pointers
- Build a filing chronology. Chart each commencement, each dismissal and its rule, and each refiling. The analysis under Kohn runs action to action, starting from a timely commenced original action (¶ 15, 18).
- Retire the per-claim one-use argument. A defense built on the theory that a claim already saved once cannot be saved again is foreclosed when the statute's terms are met (¶ 18). Look instead at whether each prior action actually failed other than on the merits and at the Civ.R. 41 safeguards the court identified (¶ 17).
- Cross-appeal what you lost. Kohn's negligence claims were revived because the case arrived as a certified conflict (¶ 21). An appellee who lost part of the case below should not count on that route.
- Weigh a certified conflict before seeking one. Certification brings the entire case, not just the certified question, before the court (¶ 21). An appellant should assess the parts of the judgment it won before inviting that review.
- Test the premise of the question. Both the certified question and the proposition of law asked whether the statute saves actions or claims, and the court called that focus a false premise (¶ 8).
The opinion
Supreme Court of Ohio · Decided October 15, 2026
Kohn v. Glenmede Trust Co., N.A., 2026-Ohio-4001
This analysis is published for Ohio attorneys and is not legal advice. It reflects the opinion as released; slip opinions are subject to formal revision before publication in the Ohio Official Reports. Appellate Ohio was not counsel in this case.