Bottom line
A for-cause challenge under R.C. 2313.17(B)(9) is a principal challenge: if the trial court finds it valid, the juror must be excused, and the court of appeals reviews the trial court's validity determination for competent, credible evidence rather than abuse of discretion. Berk and Hall are overruled to the extent they held otherwise, but the plaintiff still lost because the record supported the trial court's findings that the four challenges were not valid.
The question: what does a principal challenge to a juror's impartiality require?
R.C. 2313.17(B)(9) lets a party challenge a prospective juror for cause when “the person discloses by the person’s answers that the person cannot be a fair and impartial juror or will not follow the law as given to the person by the court” (¶ 34). R.C. 2313.17(C) classifies every challenge listed in division (B) as a principal challenge whose validity is tried by the court (¶ 25). In Estate of Price v. Kidney Care Specialists, L.L.C., 2026-Ohio-4270, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided what that classification means for the trial judge and for the court of appeals.
In a Montgomery County medical-malpractice trial, plaintiff's counsel challenged four prospective jurors for cause, relying largely on group show-of-hands questions about the burden of proof and large mental-anguish awards (¶ 8 to 12, 18 to 21). The trial court denied all four challenges. Plaintiff used peremptory challenges on two, a third was excused after a panic attack, and the fourth sat on the jury, which returned a defense verdict (¶ 22). The Second District affirmed under an abuse-of-discretion standard (¶ 23, 28).
The holding: no discretion once a challenge is valid, but validity is a finding
Justice Deters wrote for the court, joined by Chief Justice Kennedy and Justices Fischer, DeWine, Hawkins, and Shanahan. Justice Brunner concurred in judgment only, without a separate written opinion; the announcement states that she would not have changed established law that the court of appeals applied correctly.
The court held that a challenge under R.C. 2313.17(B)(9) is a principal challenge, so if the challenger establishes facts supporting it, disqualification is required and the trial court has no discretion to deny it (¶ 34, 44). To the extent they held otherwise, the court overruled Berk v. Matthews, 53 Ohio St.3d 161 (1990), and Hall v. Banc One Mgt. Corp., 2007-Ohio-4640 (¶ 35, 44). But the trial court must first try the validity of the challenge, and a court of appeals reviews that determination for competent, credible evidence, not for an abuse of discretion (¶ 36, 41). Applying that standard, the court found competent, credible evidence supporting the trial court's conclusions that all four challenges were not valid, and it affirmed the Second District's judgment despite rejecting its reasoning (¶ 3, 43, 45).
The reasoning: the statute's text, and what trying validity means
The court started with the statutory classification. Division (B)(9) sits in the list that R.C. 2313.17(C) makes principal challenges, and a valid principal challenge has long meant absolute disqualification (¶ 34). The conclusion followed directly:
“Thus, under the statutory text, a trial court has no discretion when a valid challenge is made against a prospective juror under R.C. 2313.17(B)(9): the prospective juror must be disqualified.” (¶ 34)
Berk had treated bias challenges as discretionary without discussing their principal-challenge status, and Hall had suggested the legislature's inclusion of the predecessor provision was misplaced; the court applied the statute as written instead (¶ 30, 33, 35).
That is where the appellant's win on the law met its limit. Because the court tries the validity of a principal challenge, it must examine whether the juror's answers actually disclose partiality or an unwillingness to follow the law (¶ 37, 39). The statute says answers, plural, so:
“the trial court must consider the prospective juror’s answers over the course of voir dire.” (¶ 39)
Context counts: leading or circuitous questions can produce answers that suggest bias where none exists, and later answers may show the juror will be fair and follow the law (¶ 39). On review, the deferential standard comes from the absence of discretion, not its presence: “review of a trial court’s decision regarding a principal challenge to a prospective juror is not for an abuse of discretion, because a trial court does not have discretion” (¶ 41). The court drew the competent, credible evidence standard from its earlier decision in Myers v. Garson, 1993-Ohio-9 (¶ 36, 41).
On this record the group questions did the challenger little good:
“That a prospective juror raised his or her hand at the end of that question, standing alone, does not demonstrate that prospective juror’s unwillingness to follow the law as instructed by the court” (¶ 42)
At least eight panelists raised their hands, counsel did not challenge all of them, and none said during defense questioning that they would not follow the court's instructions (¶ 42). Read in context, the individual answers showed a misunderstanding of a claim, openness to the facts, or agreement to apply the law (¶ 43).
Why it matters for Ohio appeals
Price changes how an assignment of error on a denied for-cause challenge under division (B)(9) should be framed. The standard of review is no longer abuse of discretion. The appellate question is whether competent, credible evidence supports the trial court's finding that the challenge was not valid; if the record establishes validity, the trial court had no choice but to excuse the juror.
The practical gain is narrower than the doctrinal one. The validity finding still gets deference, and every answer counts. A valid challenge cannot be cured by rehabilitation, but later answers can show the challenge was never valid. The voir dire transcript decides the appeal.
Questions remain open. Having found no error, the court did not address prejudice, such as where the party removes the juror with a peremptory challenge or the juror never sits (¶ 22, 23). The case is civil, and the opinion does not discuss R.C. 2945.25 or Crim.R. 24(C). Nor does it decide anything about R.C. 2313.17(D), the separate challenge on suspicion of prejudice, which the statute says the court sustains if it has any doubt that the juror is entirely unbiased (¶ 26).
Practice pointers
- Frame the standard correctly. In a brief challenging a denied R.C. 2313.17(B)(9) challenge, argue competent, credible evidence review under Price; do not concede abuse of discretion.
- Follow up individually. A show of hands to a long group question will not establish validity on its own. Build the record juror by juror, in the juror's own words.
- Anticipate rehabilitation questions. Opposing counsel's later questions are part of the record. If a later answer is equivocal (here, “I assume so” and “I think so, sure”), make a record of why it does not cure the earlier disclosure.
- State every ground. When the facts support it, make the challenge under both division (B)(9) and division (D) of R.C. 2313.17, and get a ruling on each.
- Preserve prejudice facts. Price did not decide prejudice, so record which peremptory challenges were used on challenged jurors, whether peremptories were exhausted, and who actually sat.
The opinion
Supreme Court of Ohio · Decided November 2, 2026
Estate of Price v. Kidney Care Specialists, L.L.C., 2026-Ohio-4270
This analysis is published for Ohio attorneys and is not legal advice. It reflects the opinion as released; slip opinions are subject to formal revision before publication in the Ohio Official Reports. Appellate Ohio was not counsel in this case.